pThis paper examines Nishida Kitarō’s (1870–1945) late essay, “Life,” which develops the process of “world-expression” (世界表現) to situate human and nonhuman agency in ways drawing his thought closer to concerns of posthuman ideals of inter-species commensurability and biosemiotics today. Here he extends his philosophy of a site-specific matrix or basho (場所) so as to incorporate arguments from J. S. Haldane’s emThe Philosophical Basis of Biology/em (1931), which poses questions concerning the coordination of organisms and environments. Nishida finds in Haldane support (...) for his own situating of selves, even engaging questions concerning how animals count as selves./p. (shrink)

…vel quod res omnes timide gelideque ministrat,dilator, † spe longus, iners avidusque futuri,diffcilis, querulus…I agree with Brink, and other editors referred to by him ad loe, that spe longus in Horace's description of the typical old man's character cannot be made to give sense. For earlier attempts at emendation, see Brink's note. Most of those who have tried to emend the passage concentrate on longus, and are reluctant to relinquish spe: this is largely due to the parallel with (...) Aristotle's account of the character of old men in Rhetoric 2. 13. 1389b 13ff., in which they are said to be, among other things it seems to me that this parallel should not be pressed too far. There is much in Aristotle that is not in Horace, and nothing to suggest close and detailed dependence. The parallel can only be relevant if spe longus can be turned into a reasonable Latin equivalent for Otherwise there is no good reason to suppose that spe is any less likely to be corrupt than longus. (shrink)

…vel quod res omnes timide gelideque ministrat, dilator, † spe longus, iners avidusque futuri, diffcilis, querulus… I agree with Brink, and other editors referred to by him ad loe, that spe longus in Horace's description of the typical old man's character cannot be made to give sense. For earlier attempts at emendation, see Brink's note . Most of those who have tried to emend the passage concentrate on longus, and are reluctant to relinquish spe: this is largely due (...) to the parallel with Aristotle's account of the character of old men in Rhetoric 2. 13. 1389b 13ff., in which they are said to be, among other things it seems to me that this parallel should not be pressed too far. There is much in Aristotle that is not in Horace, and nothing to suggest close and detailed dependence. The parallel can only be relevant if spe longus can be turned into a reasonable Latin equivalent for Otherwise there is no good reason to suppose that spe is any less likely to be corrupt than longus. (shrink)

The achievements of the textile industry in Roman Britain are often underestimated as a result of the meagreness of our available evidence. The Edict on maximum prices issued by Diocletian in A.D. 301 shows that British capes commanded high prices on the markets of the Empire, and that in the late third century A.D. British rugs were the best in the world. In view of the competition from the traditional centres of rug manufacture in the East, this is an astonishing (...) achievement. (shrink)

The received translation and interpretation of many of the technical terms current in the textile industry of the Roman Empire are inaccurate, because lexicographers have either fought shy of being precise, or have thought that they recognized in the ancient world technical processes which originated at a much later date. The evidence is often equivocal or insufficient, but may still yield details that have been overlooked. The textile expression scutulatus, to take an example, deserves more attention than Blümner has devoted (...) to it. When it refers to the appearance of a garment, Lewis and Short, s.v. scutulatus, translate ‘diamond or lozenge-shaped, checkered’. It seems worth while to attempt a more precise translation, and, if possible, to estimate the significance in context of the goods so designated. (shrink)

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional conception of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial condition fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches respectively. In (...) the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

This investigation analyzed Islamic spirituality as measured by a Muslim Experiential Religiousness Scale. Iranian university and seminary students responded to this instrument along with the Psychological Measure of Islamic Religiousness and Perceived Stress and Self-Esteem scales. Muslim Experiential Religiousness correlated predictably with all PMIR sub-scales, Perceived Stress, and Self-Esteem, and mediated almost all relationships of the PMIR Islamic Beliefs subscale with religious functioning. When evaluated by participants, Muslim Experiential Religiousness items proved to be “rational” relative to their Muslim religious ideals. (...) Women in an Islamic seminary scored higher on Muslim Experiential Religiousness than Islamic women in a more general university, and Muslim Experiential Religiousness also mediated the many other religious differences observed between these two student groups. These data most importantly identified the Muslim Experiential Religiousness Scale as a useful instrument for testing hypotheses about the dynamics of Muslim spirituality. (shrink)

Research suggests that religious beliefs may both help and hinder how Muslims cope. In a Pakistani sample, the Positive Islamic Coping, Islamic Identity, and Extra-Prayer Commitment factors from the Psychological Measure of Islamic Religiousness correlated negatively with Perceived Stress and positively with Mental Well-Being, Intrinsic Religious Orientation, and Extrinsic Personal Religious Orientation. Islamic Identity also partially mediated the negative relationship of Perceived Stress with Mental Well-Being. A Punishing Allah Reappraisal factor failed to display any evidence that it operationalized a maladaptive (...) form of Muslim coping. These data most importantly confirmed the positive coping potentials of Muslim commitments, with Islamic Identity being especially noteworthy. (shrink)

Doctors’ strikes are legally permissible in the UK, with the situation differing in other countries. But are they morally permissible? Doug McConnell and Darren Mann have systematically attempted to dismiss the arguments for the moral impermissibility of doctors’ strikes and creatively attempted to provide further moral justification for them. Unfortunately for striking doctors, they fail to achieve this. Meanwhile, junior doctors’ strikes have continued in the UK through 2023 and have now extended into 2024. In this response, which focuses on (...) the UK situation and specifically junior doctors’ strikes in the National Health Service (NHS) in England, I will demonstrate a central problem with their arguments—namely that they underplay the harms caused by prolonged doctors’ strikes by ignoring the harms to patients with cancer. This weakens their conclusion that strikes are morally permissible in terms of the conditions and thresholds they set. I then provide a psychological critique of their justification for strikes in terms of the interests of the public. It follows that invoking the controversial concept of supererogatory action is ungrounded but also absurd when you consider time-critical cancer care. If those representing striking doctors wish to maintain a modicum of moral respectability, they should mitigate for patients with cancer and negotiate reasonably and with urgency. (shrink)

Trans Philosophy: Meaning and Mattering will be the first authoritative collection to establish trans philosophy as a unique field of inquiry. It defines trans philosophy as philosophical work that is accountable to and illuminative of transgender experiences, histories, cultural production, and politics. The book will showcase work from a range of fresh and established voices in this nascent field. It will address a variety of topics (e.g. embodiment, identity, language, law, politics, transphobia), utilize diverse philosophical methods (e.g. analytic, continental, and (...) pluralist; theoretical, experimental, and applied), and attend to significant intersections between trans identity and class, disability, race, and sexuality. Across language and politics, feminism and phenomenology, decolonial theory and disability studies, trans philosophy concerns itself with trans worldmaking in all its excruciating beauty and mundanity. (shrink)

Du sommaire: Ambiguite et comprehension du langage (Paul Bogaards, Johan Rooryck). - Why pluralities don't mean a thing (Crit Cremers). - Aspects of interlingual ambiguity: polyglot punning (Dirk Delabastita). - Les feux de Saint-Antoine (Sjef Houppermans). - The semantics of Dutch moeten 'must, should, have to' from a typological and a relevance-theoretical perspective (Theo Janssen). - L'ambiguite en langue et en discours (Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni).".

1. Introduction. It is an amazing thing that, unlike pebbles, clouds and stars, the smallest building stones of Nature—the electrons, the protons and the neutrons—are all completely uniform. There seems to be a necessity in Nature for systems of a very special form, and one can wonder now what kind of necessity this is. I believe that this can only be a mathematical necessity, that consequently the principle of Nature is a mathematical one. How else could Nature obey the mathematical (...) laws of physics if it were not because of her own principle? It can be argued that these mathematical laws, like Newtonian mechanics, the classical theory of electromagnetism and the quantum theory of the electron are all some form of beginner's luck, and that continued investigation will reveal Nature as more and more mysterious and irrational. If that were true, one might as well give up the pursuit of physics completely! But on one hand modern physics has discovered what we believe to be the elementary particles of the material world, and on the other hand it comes out that at least a part of these elementary forms obey mathematic laws to a very high degree of accuracy. (shrink)

Between 1787, and the end of his life in 1832, Bentham turned his attention to the development and application of economic ideas and principles within the general structure of his legislative project. For seventeen years this interest was manifested through a number of books and pamphlets, most of which remained in manuscript form, that develop a distinctive approach to economic questions. Although Bentham was influenced by Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, he (...) neither adopted a Smithian vocabulary for addressing questions of economic principle and policy, nor did he accept many of the distinctive features of Smith's economic theory. One consequence of this was that Bentham played almost no part in the development of the emerging science of political economy in the early nineteenth century. The standard histories of economics all emphasize how little he contributed to the mainstream of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century debate by concentrating attention on his utilitarianism and the psychology of hedonism on which it is premised. Others have argued that the calculating nature of his theory of practical reason reduced the whole legislative project to a crude attempt to apply economics to all aspects of social and political life. Put at its simplest this argument amounts to the erroneous claim that Bentham's science of legislation is reducible to the science of political economy. A different but equally dangerous error would be to argue that because Bentham's conception of the science of legislation comprehends all the basic forms of social relationships, there can be no science of political economy as there is no autonomous sphere of activity governed by the principles of economics. This approach is no doubt attractive from an historical point of view given that the major premise of this argument is true, and that many of Bentham's ‘economic’ arguments are couched in terms of his theory of legislation. Yet it fails to account for the undoubted importance of political economy within Bentham's writings, not just on finance, economic policy, colonies and preventive police, but also in other aspects of his utilitarian public policy such as prison reform, pauper management, and even constitutional reform. All of these works reflect a conception of political economy in its broadest terms. However, this conception of political economy differs in many respects from that of Bentham's contemporaries, and for this reason Bentham's distinctive approach to problems of economics and political economy has largely been misunderstood. (shrink)

Theism, according to David O'Connor, has in recent centuries been on trial for its life, the charge being that the existence of so much evil in the world is incompatible with belief in a benevolent creator. But this trial, he claims is incapable of producing a reasoned verdict.

In his paper ‘Has the Ontological Argument Been Refuted?’, 97–110) William F. Vallicella argues that my attempt to show that the Ontological Argument begs the question is unsuccessful. 1 I believe he is wrong about this, but before endeavouring to vindicate my position I must first make clear what precisely is the point at issue between us. The Ontological Argument is not a single argument, but a family of arguments. Newly devised formulations of the argument are frequently put forward by (...) philosophers in an effort to avoid difficulties that have been pointed out in previous versions. As a consequence there is no possibility of a conclusive proof that every form of the argument embodies the same fallacy. Nevertheless, one can, I believe, prove that all the standard versions of the argument embody a certain fallacy and that, given the nature of the argument, it is therefore unlikely that the argument can be formulated in such a way as to avoid this difficulty. What I tried to show in my paper is that the six best-known versions of the argument all beg the question and that they do so at the same point in the argument, namely when it is asserted that it is possible that an absolutely perfect being exists. It is difficult to see how an ontological argument could be formulated without including this claim as one of its premises, since the distinguishing badge of the argument is the inference from the possibility of an absolutely perfect being to its actuality. It must be unlikely then, if my criticism of these six versions is correct, that there is any way of formulating the argument that avoids this fallacy. (shrink)

P J Crittenden; Thoughts about Locke's Thoughts about Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–160, https://doi.

The Bible: Sole basis for Reformed church polity?Most scholars in the Reformed tradition claim that the Bible is the sole basis of their views on church polity. The author looks at the different ways the Bible is used by Reformed scholars in establishing church principles. He shows that other factors also play a part. Some of these factors are not recognized by those who use them; they are not necessarily wrong and need to be acknowledged and examined. These factors include (...) confessions of faith, a viewpoint on what the church is, attitudes to society as a whole, and the scholar’s cosmological insights. (shrink)

What lies at the heart of physical inquiry? What are the foundational ideas and working assumptions that inform the enterprise of natural science? What principles guide research? How do scientists decide whether they are building theories in the right direction? Is there a right direction? Do physical theories actually approximate an objective reality, or are they simply useful summaries, mnemonics for experimental results? This book is Nobel Prize winner Jim Peebles's contribution to such big, classic debates in the philosophy of (...) science, drawing on a lifetime of experience as a leading physicist and taking the development of physical cosmology as a "worked example." He begins with a consideration of the history of thought about the nature of the physical sciences since Einstein, culminating in a succinct statement of what he sees as the fundamental working assumptions of physics. Then, through a careful examination of the development of the general theory of relativity, Einstein's cosmological principle, the big bang theory, and our current model of the universe, he makes the argument that physical theories ultimately are useful approximations to an objective reality whose nature science is discovering. An essential reflection on and interrogation of the nature and practice of science by a giant in the field, The Whole Truth will be illuminating reading for cosmologists, physicists, and historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science alike. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Meaning and the Copy Principle External Objects Causal Power The Self and Necessary Connection Acknowledgments References.

Currently, the universal human rights model relies on the notion of individual human rights. According to Michael Ignatieff, this is based on the fact that universal human rights are necessarily individual rights. However, there are cultures in which persons define themselves as relational beings (firmly believing that the foundation of their value as persons rests in their being an integral part of a larger whole rather than their being identified as an individual self). Thus, the problem arises as to whether (...) universal human rights can apply to such persons. In this paper, I will argue that Ignatieff is mistaken; there can be (both theoretically and practically) collective human rights. Moreover, respect for human agency requires us to incorporate collective human rights into the universal human rights model so as to make these rights applicable to all human beings—individuals and relational beings. (shrink)